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This paper intends to evaluate Ryanair’s share price by the end of 2020 by 
applying two valuation methods: Multiples and DCF. Ryanair is the largest 
European Airline Group presenting the highest market share in passengers’ 
traffic and setting historical lowest average fares in the European airline 
industry. We believe that Ryanair will keep ahead of competition, once we 
predict a strong performance for the upcoming years. Our price 
recommendation is to ‘Buy’ grounded in a price target of 16.77€ and an 
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MSCI World & Ryanair Cumulative Returns 
Source: Bloomberg & Analysts Estimates 
  
(Values in € millions) 2019 2020E 2021F 
Revenues 7697.4 7912.0 8284.0 
Schedule Revenue 5261.1 5360,2 5566.3 
Ancillary Revenue 2436.3 2551.8 2717.8 
Operating Costs 5956.2 5505.4 5662.9 
EBITDAR  1737.7 2405,0 2619.3 
EBITDAR margin (%) 22.6% 30.4% 31.6% 
NOPLAT 945.9 1511.7 1634.7 
FCF 1297.0 2116.7 656.8 
EPS 0.78x 1.29x 1.38x 
ROIC (%) 19% 26% 31% 
Growth Rate (%) 19% -10% 19% 









Ryanair is flying above the clouds 
The European Permanent Winner 
 
• We are long on Ryanair’s stock, supporting a ‘BUY’ 
recommendation with the underlying price target of 16.77€. Ryanair’s 
strengths such as its most competitive average per passenger fare (37€ 
FY19 vs. 47€ Wizz Air; 61€ EasyJet), the lowest unit cost of EU airlines 
(Cost per Booked Pax.: 47€ Ryanair vs. 56€ Wizz Air and 64€ EasyJet), 
and considerable margins (Operating Margin: 13% FY19 vs. 13% IAG; 
8% Lufthansa), allow the airline to progress within a fierce environment 
in the European airline sector;  
• We expect further boost in demand (RPMS Growth: +4.2% 
FY21; +2.7% FY20) and even higher load factor (97% from FY20 
onwards) leading to the most competitive average fares (36.6€ FY21; 
36.8€ FY20).  
• In addiction the arrival of the new Boeing 737-MAX-200, with 
higher number of seats per aircraft (+4% than Boeing 737-800) and 
lower fuel consumption per seat (-16%) will allow the airline to save on 
fuel costs in the next 5 years (CAGR 2020-2024: -2.2%); 
• We forecast a FCF of 656.8€ in FY21 lower than the FCF of 
2216.7€ in FY20 due to heavily investment on Boeing 737-Max-200 (+60 
aircrafts FY21). Multiples from the DCF valuation are 9.8x EV/EBITDA, 
13.4x EV/EBIT and 13.0x P/E whereas multiples from comparable 
airlines suggest 5.4x EV/EBITDA, 9.9 EV/EBIT and 11.2x P/E.  
Company description 
Ryanair is an Irish low-cost airline which not only offers low air fares but 
also other ancillary services. It operates mainly in Europe with more than 
2100 different routes and offers 2400 short-haul flights a day. It has a 
team with around 19000 employees who serve 219 airports in 39 
different countries and with a record number of passengers (142M /+9% 
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Overview: Ryanair has been pressured by tough competition in Europe, 
forcing its average fares to drop year after year (Δfare prices: -0.8% FY20 
est., -6.0% FY19; FY18 -2.9%). In a saturated market as the European short-
haul sector, Ryanair ceases to appeal to a growing demand (RPMS growth: 
+3.2% FY18; +8.9% FY19) by setting prices lower than its peers (Average 
fare: 37€ vs 47€ Wizz Air and 61€ EasyJet) (see Exhibit 1). The fierce 
competition has displayed several bankruptcies (Thomas Cook Airlines 
failure1 and Air Berlin2) as well as numerous mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry (M&A activities: IAG & AER Lingus3; Ryanair & Buzz, Malta and 
Laudamotion).  Inevitably, we believe European airlines are entering in a 
stage, whereby leading airlines are starting to grow inorganically by taking 
others’ failures as opportunities. 
Risk factors: Ryanair has been running its business in turbulent times of 
political, economic and regulatory issues. First, Brexit which was prolonged 
for quite long-time hitting UK’s demand (in 3% to 5%)4. Second, uncertainty 
associated to 2014 Boeing Contract – waiting for FAA and EASA certification 
– which may culminate in further aircraft delays5. Third, operating costs 
which tend to increase such as airports and handling charges (in % 
operating costs: 20.4% FY20; 17.8% FY19) in capacity constrained airports 
as well as fuel costs which are an unpredictable part of Ryanair’s costs and 
cannot be passed away through average fares to passengers (Ryanair’s no-
fuel-surcharges policy).  
Reasons to Believe: We still believe in a further boost in demand (RPMS 
growth: +4.1% FY22; +4.2% FY21) related to GDP growth of the countries in 
Ryanair’s routes system. We also predict higher load factors to the upcoming 
years, as a result of Ryanair’s effort to be the most efficient in Europe (i.e. 
“the cleanest greenest major airline”). In addition, the arrival of the new 
Boeing 737-Max-200 with the most efficient fuel consumption (-16.0% fuel 
consumption per seat) and higher seats per aircraft (+8 seats/+4%). And 
lastly, we factor out Ryanair’s market share in passengers’ traffic as positive 
sign of its successful performance in within European Union frontiers (see 
Exhibit 2).  
 
1Thomas, Daniel and Hancock, Alice.2019.”Cost of Thomas Cook collapse becomes clearer”. Financial Times. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/1104e16a-dee8-11e9-b112-
9624ec9edc59 
2Heller,Gernot.2017.”Aviation regulation at fault for Air Berlin failure: German tourism body”. BNN Bloomberg. Retrieved from: https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/aviation-regulation-at-
fault-for-air-berlin-failure-german-tourism-body-1.843808 
3 Boland,Vincent. 2015. “IAG cleared for Aer Lingus takeover”. Financial Times. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/9fd19dec-2a5c-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca 
4 International Air Transport Association (IATA). 2019 
5 Hepher, Tim 2019. “Exclusive: Europe regulator to clear Boeing 737 MAX in January at earliest”. Reuters. Retrieved from : https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-easa-
exclusive/exclusive-europe-regulator-to-clear-boeing-737-max-in-jan-at-earliest-idUSKBN1X021S 
Exhibit 1: Ryanair’s Average Fare Change and RPMS Growth 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates   
Exhibit 2: Annual Air Traffic Share of Passengers 
Carried in EU28 countries 
Source: IATA & Analysts Estimates 
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Considering all factors mentioned, but not including Brexit and Aircraft delays 
in the analysis, our price recommendation is ‘Buy’, since the underlying price 
target is 16.77€. Including Brexit, our price recommendation is to ‘Buy’ if the 
U.K demand decreases by 3% and ‘Hold if it decreases between 4% and 
5%. Finally, when we take into account aircrafts grounded our price 
recommendation is ‘Buy’ whereas in a situation of Boeing delays the price 
recommendation changes to ‘Sell’.   
Company Overview  
Ryanair DAC (Designed Activity Company) is an Irish company founded in 
1985 by Christopher Ryan, Liam Lonergan and Tony Ryan, with 
headquarters in Dublin, Ireland. Ryanair became the first European airline to 
replicate ‘Southwest Airlines’ business model, not merely by offering low 
fares but also by implementing low-cost operations.  
Subsequently to deregulation in EU, Ryanair expanded operations all over 
Europe. In 2016 Ryanair was proclaimed “the largest European airline in 
scheduled passengers flown reaching 100M passengers in one year.” In 
2017 ‘Ryanair Sun’ was formed, it is Ryanair’s subsidiary in Poland. In 2018, 
Ryanair acquired a 75% stake in ‘Laudamotion’, successfully appropriating 
from its fleet that comes from another supplier (Airbus A320). Immediately 
after in 2019, the fifth airline acquired by Ryanair was ‘Malta Air’, the one 
planned to ensure connections between Europe and Africa, flying to over 60 
destinations. Still in 2019, Ryanair bought the remaining 25% stake of 
‘Laudamotion’ and rebranded ‘Ryanair Sun’ as ‘Buzz’.  
 Nowadays, Ryanair has more than 2100 different routes throughout Europe, 
and offers more than 2400 short-haul flights a day, serving 219 airports in 39 
different countries, with approximately 19000 employees and close to 142M 
scheduled passengers in FY2019. In 2019, Ryanair added 86 more airports 








Exhibit 3: Ryanair’s History  
Source: Ryanair’s Official Website  
   
 
 









Shareholders Ownership  
Ryanair Holdings PLC has a total of 271 institutional investors who own 
430.97M shares (nearly 38% of Ryanair total ordinary shares). Ryanair has 
44.1% of shares outstanding of which 43.3% are float shares.6    
Shareholders with higher percentages of Ryanair’s shares are represented 
on the left pie (see Exhibit 4).  
Inside holders’ positions have changed during 2019. Two of the eight 
Ryanair’s Holdings PLC inside holders raised their exposure to Ryanair by 
buying more shares of the airline (Phelan Louise +23175 shares to 30000 
shares) and O’Neill Julie (+1000 shares to 1000). Regarding the CEO 
O’Leary Michael, he also bought an additional amount (+2M shares to 
46096725 shares) in 3rd quarter of 2019. These evidences are aligned to our 
view that Ryanair is currently undervalued (see Exhibit 5)    
Under EU regulation, Ryanair is required to be majority owned by EU citizens 
in order to safeguard its operating license inside EU frontiers. To set up this 
requirement the management team established a maximum number of 
ordinary shares held by non-EU citizens. If needed the management team 
may ask non-EU shareholders to dispose from their shares within a 21 days 
period. Recently, the “permitted maximum” shares were set at 49.9% of 
Ryanair shareholders ownership structure. 
 
Strategy  
Concerning its long-term strategy, Ryanair is seeking to implement  
“aggressive fare promotion” (i.e. “early breaks flights from 14.99€” which are 
their low-cost getaways and special occasion advertising “Cyber week with 
50000 seats 5€ each”)7, rise routes inside Europe and to North Africa 
together with escalating flights to main destinations (Sectors flown: 800005 
FY20; 826149 FY21; Δ+3.3%) and finally aims to increase the number of 
airports within its itinerary (nº of airports served: FY20 228 airports and 
FY21 237 airports; Δ+3.9%) (see Exhibit 6).  
Regarding fare prices, these are set on basis of demand for a certain flight 
and the time for the flight to depart. The higher the demand the higher will be 
 
6 Bloomberg 



































Inside Holders Positions 2019
Phelan Louise
O'Neill Julie
Exhibit 4: Ryanair’s Largest Shareholders  
Source: Bloomberg & Analysts Estimates  
   
Exhibit 5: Inside Holders Changes in Positions, 2019  
Source: Bloomberg  
   
Exhibit 6: Ryanair’s Sector Flown and Airports Served 
Evolution 
Source: Annual Report 
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the price and the sooner the time for the flight to depart, the more expensive 
will be for customers. Our research team expects annual average fares to 
change according to the load factors, which is foreseen to be higher for the 
upcoming years (Load factor: 96% FY19 and 97% FY20-FY29) and as result 
averages fares decrease (Average Fares: 37.03€ FY19 and 36.75€ FY20). 
Last but not the least, Ryanair customer service is also a relevant part of 
Ryanair’s strategy which is constantly monitored in order to guarantee the 
highest standards of customers’ service are achieved. For instance, 
comparing Ryanair versus its peers, Ryanair is the leader in punctuality with 




There are indeed other elements which may jeopardize Ryanair’s strategy 
and its low-cost business that will be further detailed such as on the side of 
costs, fuel costs (being the largest extent of Ryanair’s costs) and airport and 
handling charges (that will likely to rise due to the lack of available airports’ 
slots). On the side of the revenues is the economic growth (GDP which 
directly explains Ryanair’s demand). 
 
Macro-Economic Trends  
Fuel Costs 
Fuel cost are indeed the predominant cost of airlines’ cost structure, 
representing close to 25%8 of average operating costs among airlines 
worldwide and around 36% of Ryanair’s operating costs (see Exhibit 8).   
Jet fuel primary source is the crude oil. The last as any commodity is subject 
to wide price fluctuations that arise from underlying political and economic 
issues such as international terrorism or hostility periods for instance, recent 
China-US Trade War, Iran’s Oil Exports and limited spare capacity in OPEC9  
(see Exhibit 9). Nonetheless, there are even more conditionings that may lead 
to further price changes such as by the fact that crude oil is priced in U.S. 
dollars. It turns out to be risky to airlines, with revenues/income in other 
currencies by exposing them to the exchange rate risk. Particularly the case 
 
8 Source: International Air Transport Association (IATA,2019)  
9 Ntshalintshali,Thembinkosi.2018.”Oil Prices and the airline Industry” Trade Finance Global. Retrieved from:https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/posts/oil-prices-and-the-airline-
industry/ 
 
All in % Ryanair Easyjet IAG Lufthansa WizzAir
Punctuality Metric >90% 75% 76% 72% 72%
Exhibit 7: Punctuality across Airlines  
Source: Airlines Annual Reports 
   
Exhibit 8: Fuel Costs Share of Total Operating Costs 
(2009-2019) 
Source: Annual Report  
Exhibit 9: Jet Fuel Price over Time 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
 








of Ryanair, once its fuel costs are denominated in Euros, the airline is by all 
means subject to the strength of Dollar against Euro and consequent impact 
on its performance.   
Therefore, jet fuel costs volatility combined with FX risk, encourage airlines to 
minimize losses through hedging strategies i.e. forward contracts. However, 
there are indeed certain limitations since these contracts do not fully protect 
the investor or neither work in a very long horizon. 
Among European Airlines, Ryanair is the most covered by hedging strategies, 
presenting forward hedging contracts that protect nearly 90% of 2019 fuel 
costs requirements versus Lufthansa which hedges 76%, IAG 69%, EasyJet 
68% among others (see Exhibit 10).  
There is an alternative way to save on fuel costs, by acquiring modern 
aircrafts with higher number of seats and lessen fuel consumption per seat (-
16%) i.e. the order of Boeing 737-Max-200 by Ryanair.  
GDP 
 The aviation sector accounts significantly to the economic development, by 
noticing its contribution of 3.6% on the global gross domestic product. At the 
European level the contribution is smaller but still relevant accounting to 
2.1%10 of European GDP. 
There is a peculiar correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
RPK (R2= 75%11) (see Exhibit 11). The former, which is representative of all 
economic activity, when used to forecast air traffic demand, it is so broad that 
it can in fact reflect economic, demographic and income factors in the 
evolution of the aviation sector.  Analysing a series of data from 1980 to 2018, 
evidences show a clear relationship between GDP and air passenger 
demand: whenever GDP growth decreases, also air traffic demand shrinks 
(see Exhibit 12). 
In countries with higher GDP (i.e. developed countries) usually the previous 
correlation is even more powerful.  
Ryanair operates mainly in Europe and recently extended operations also to 
North Africa. In those regions real GDP growth is foreseen to be 1.50% and 
3.60%12 accordingly. The year 2019 was exceptional because in fact the 
previous correlation was not verified. In other words, in spite of economic and 
 
10 European Commission. 2019.” Mobility and Transport”. Accessed on December 28. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air_en 
11 Resulting from a regression between the world air passenger demand and the world nominal GDP, in a period of 38 years (1980-2018). 
12 International Monetary fund (IMF) 
Exhibit 10: Extent of Jet Fuel Hedging 
Source: Annual Reports  
Exhibit 11: Regression Analysis between Air Travel 
Demand and Global GDP Growth 
Source: Analysts Estimates & World Bank data  
Exhibit 12: GDP Growth and Air Traffic Demand 
(1980-2018) 
Source: World Bank Data  
 
 








political uncertainties – arising due to Brexit as well as US-China Trade war - 
RPK growth rate was still 7.7% in Europe and 5.1%13 in Africa. 
In the case of Ryanair, even though Ryanair is headquartered in Ireland, a 
country which has presented high GDP growth along the last 6 years, it still 
has a great share of its revenues coming from UK operations and thus subject 
to UK’s decline in GDP growth due to Brexit. (see Exhibit 13). 
Brexit  
UK has a privilege location with around 80%14 of North Atlantic Traffic passing 
through U.K. and Irish controlled space. Besides that, several consolidated 
airlines have their headquarters in U.K such as the case of EasyJet and 
British Airways. Concerning airports, the Heathrow Airport, in London is 
ranked at the 7th position in the Top 20 of the busiest airports worldwide rank, 
by Airports council International 2019.  
Therefore, UK is by no means, a significant region to the airline sector, and 
considering the regression above, if any economic bust is to happen due to 
Brexit, also a decrease in air passenger demand is very likely to display. 
Estimates suggest that air traffic demand in UK can shrink in an interval from 
3% to 5%15 in 2020. 
The outcome of Brexit meaning, trade deal negotiations that are to happen 
between UK and EU can end in no more than 3 scenarios, impacting UK’s 
economy also at very different levels: Hard Brexit, Non-Deal and Soft Brexit. 
In the event of a Hard Brexit, all UK citizens will be considered non-EU 
citizens, in that sense, Ryanair could be majority owned by non-EU citizens, 
with almost 70%16 of non-EU shareholders. Nevertheless, due to Ryanair’s 
rule of Non-EU shareholders restricted shares, a significant part of them will 
have to return their shares to other EU citizens.  
The result of a Non-Deal scenario between EU and U.K., is a possible GDP 
decrease at around 5.5%17. 
The end scenario is a Soft Brexit which is the underlying assumption of our 
model, by supporting the hypothesis of U.K. together with EU, remaining as a 
single market and thus avoiding any sudden disruption of their historical trade 
relations.  
 
13 Boeing Market outlook: https://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/market/commercial-market-outlook/assets/downloads/cmo-sept-2019-report-final.pdf 
14 International Air Transport Associatiom.2018.” A study of the effects of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union on airlines flying to and from the UK”. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iata.org/contentassets/e22c55cf063a47d5915886f6675c1f39/iata-brexit-study.pdf 
15 International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2019) 
16 Ryanair’s Annual Report 
17 Partington, Richard and Wearden.2019.”Bank of England: no-deal Brexit less severe than first though”. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/04/bank-of-england-revises-impact-of-no-deal-brexit-from-8-to-5-of-gdp 
 
Ryanair’s shareholders structure 
is likely to be compromised after 
Brexit 
Exhibit 13: Real GDP growth (2000-2019) 
Source: IMF 
United Kingdom aerospace is an 












There are other additional fluctuations such as volatility in global stocks’ 
market and currency exchange fluctuations likely to jeopardize company’s 
performance. A referendum may expose UK to a loss of about 11% due to 
pound sterling devaluation, affecting Ryanair’s revenues at around 22% which 
is the share of Ryanair’s revenues coming from UK and which are paid in 
pound sterling. Each 1 pence sterling fluctuation in Euro-Sterling exchange 
rate means 7M€ of losses in Ryanair’s income.  
Brexit was extended until 31st of January 2020 and up until that moment U.K 
will be still EU member, integrating European Union Aviation Safety agency. 
 
Long-Haul versus Short-Haul  
In general, LCCs have operated under a short-haul flights system, but 
recently there has been a shift from these airlines to operate in the long-haul 
market (a shift from 1% to 4% in 201818). The change came as a result of 
higher market complexity as well as more demanding customers. In Europe 
the first LCC to extend its operations to the long-haul was Norwegian in 2013, 
followed by Eurowings, Primera Air and many others that came later.19  
In addiction there has been a number of partnerships within the industry with 
short-haul airlines partnering with mid to long-haul airlines for instance 
EasyJet joined forces with Emirates20 and Ryanair with Air Europa in 201821.  
Ryanair’s partnership with Air Europa happened due to the aim of Ryanair to 
start flying to North, Central and South America, however there were many 
issues with the booking system integration and therefore this partnership did 
not last long.22  
Other steps were given by Ryanair with intent of starting to serve in the long-
haul. The investment in the new Boeing 737-MAX-200 and the recent 







18 Boeing Market outlook 2019: https://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/market/commercial-market-outlook/assets/downloads/cmo-sept-2019-report-final.pdf 
19Centre for Aviation (CAPA). 2018.” Europe’s Low cost long haul airlines establish themselves”. Retrieved from:  https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/airline-leader/europes-low-cost-
long-haul-airlines-establish-themselves-439156 
20 Smith,Matt.2018. “Emirates Partnership with Easy Jet set a  strengthen company’s European network”. Arab News. Retrieved from: 
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1414206/business-economy 
21 O’Halloran, Barry.2018.”Ryanair customers able to book flights from Malta”. The Irish Times. Retrieved from: https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/ryanair-
customers-able-to-book-onward-flights-from-malta-1.3603323 
22 Vannahme, Adrian 2019. “Ryanair Ends Partnership with Air Europa”. Airline Geeks. Retrieved from: https://airlinegeeks.com/2019/02/24/ryanair-ends-partnership-with-air-europa/ 
New Low-Cost Business model, 
with more complexity 
 
 








Air Traffic Growth  
Air passengers’ demand has been increasing in the last decades, mainly due 
to economic growth, as previously mentioned (see Exhibit 14). 
In the next 20 years, world air passenger traffic is foreseen to reach a robust 
growth by presenting an average 4.6%23 year on year. 
Ryanair operates in North Africa (8% share) and Europe (92% share) 
continents, being the latter its most significant market so far. From 2018 to 
2019 passengers’ demand growth was 6.9% in Europe whereas in Africa it 
was only up by 2.6% 24. Ryanair overcame European demand growth denoted 
by its RPMS growth of 9% in FY19 that compares to RPMS growth of other 
peers of 5% Lufthansa and 6% IAG however still lower than EasyJet 9.4%. 
The present challenge to airlines is to resolve the conflict arising from 
overcapacity while aiming to meet the growing demand. The way airlines 
have addressed this issue is by investing into more efficient aircrafts and by 
always ensuring the highest load factors possible (see Exhibit 15). 
Ryanair’s demand increases of 8.9% was also accompanied by the rise of 
9.3% of the available seat miles (“ASMs”) and the most competitive load 
factor of 96% which reports its competitive advantage in efficiency matters.   
 
The Sector  
European air traffic in number of passengers carried has been constantly 
growing at around 6% CAGR between 2014 and 2018 in EU 28 countries25. 
Ryanair is the market share leader of Europe air traffic (Market Share FY18:  
11.8% Ryanair versus 8.0% EasyJet, 7.2% Lufthansa, 2.7% Wizz Air, 2.7% 
Air France and 2.7% IAG). Prominent airlines have also presented 
substantial revenues’ growth rates such as Air-France (+4.3% FY19) and 
IAG (+6,0% FY19). In the case of LCCs, this growth is even more impressive 
if we take some examples i.e. Wizz Air (+19.1% FY19), EasyJet (+8.3% 
FY19) and Ryanair (+7,6% FY19) (see Exhibit 16)  
 Simultaneously operating costs have also been growing , sometimes even 
more than revenues, in Europe airline sector (Δ Operating Costs: +30% Dart 
Group, +23,1% Ryanair and 21,9% Wizz Air) (see Exhibit 17) and therefore 
profits are consequently compromised within the sector (Profit/Change in 
 
23International Air Transport Association (IATA,2019)  
24 European Travel Commission.2019. “European Tourism-Trends&Prospects”. Retrieved from: https://etc-corporate.org/uploads/2019/07/ETC_Quarterly_Report_Q2_2019.pdf 
25 Eurostat 
Exhibit 14: Air Passengers’ Demand worldwide(1970-
2018) 
Source: World Bank 
Exhibit 15: Airlines Load Factor and RPK Growth 
Source: Annual Reports 
Exhibit 16: Airlines Total Revenues and Revenues Growth   
Source: Annual Reports 
Exhibit 17: Airlines Total Operating Costs and Operating 
Costs Growth  
Source: Annual Reports 
 
 








2018-2019: 885M€/-39% Ryanair versus 349M€/-41% EasyJet, 
292M€/+6,0% Wizz Air and 171M€/-58,3% Air-France) (see Exhibit 18).  
Profits shrunken also led to several mergers and acquisitions activities in the 
airline sector. Airlines with sustainable competitive advantages ended up 
acquiring those that fall behind such as the following cases: IAG & AER 
Lingus merge26 and Ryanair acquisitions of Buzz, Malta Air and 
Laudamotion. In other words, consolidated players in the sector took over 
from these opportunities (Ryanair and IAG) and started investing in inorganic 
growth. 
One existing issue in the airline industry that results from a saturated market 
as of today, is overcapacity of slots in airports. Recently airlines have been 
ordering huge amounts of aircrafts to their fleets in an attempt to address 
future growth in demand for flights.27 However, there is now a clear problem 
of available space in airports. To handle this, some airlines have attempt to 
change from narrow-body aircraft such as Ryanair from Boeing 737-800 with 
189 seats, to wider body aircrafts the Boeing 737-MAX-200 with 197 seats, 








• Low-Cost Carriers 
The low-cost business model was founded in 1971 by Southwest Airlines.  
And as soon as deregulation in the EU happened, the low-cost model was 
also implemented in Europe. Ryanair was the pioneer, with first flights 
starting in 1985. After Ryanair, its main competitor EasyJet was founded in 
1995. The success of the low-cost business model is specifically assured by 




26 Boland,Vincent.2015. “IAG cleared for Aer Lingus takeover”. Financial Times. Retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/9fd19dec-2a5c-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca 
27 Bouwer, J. & Maxwell, D. & Saxon Steve 2015. “Gridlock on the ground: How airlines can respond to airport congestion”. McKinsey. Retrieved from: 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/gridlock-on-the-ground-how-airlines-can-respond-to-airport-congestion 
Exhibit 18: Airlines Total Profit and Profit Growth  
Source: Annual Reports 
Future Orders of Wide-Body 
Aircrafts to Short-Haul 
Nº of Aircrafts Model Nº of Seats
Easyjet 103 A320 Neo & A321 Neo 194/244
Ryanair 210 Boeing 737-Max-200 197
Lufthansa 140 A320 Neo 194
WizzAir 129 A321Ceo & A321Neo 230/244
Exhibit 19: Future Orders of Wide-Body Aircrafts to the Short-Haul Market 
Source: Annual Reports 
Exhibit 20: Comparable Airlines Analysis  
Source: Annual Reports & Analysts Estimates 
 
 








 In order to compare Ryanair with companies with similar operating model, 
we choose LCCs not only from Europe such as EasyJet and Wizz Air but 
also from US, Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways.  
 EasyJet is so far the most relevant comparable of Ryanair because it is the 
second airline after Ryanair with the highest market share of air traffic in EU-
28 (Market Share: 8.0% in FY18). In addition, EasyJet has also competitive 
averages fares (61€ EasyJet versus 37€ Ryanair) and very high load factors 
(93% EasyJet versus 96% Ryanair). Its financing structure is also aligned to 
Ryanair’s own capital structure (Net Debt to Equity: 9.31% EasyJet and 
9.29% Ryanair).  
Wizz-Air is another European LCC considered due to its impressive growth 
in revenues from 2017 to 2018 (+24%) and from 2018 to 2019 (19%). This 
growth was simultaneously accompanied by profit growth year after year 
(Profit growth: +6,0% 2018/2019; +11,8% 2017/2018). Besides, the 
Hungarian airline has also reached substantial load factors (91% Wizz Air), 
ending up with high operating margins (14% Wizz Air). However, when using 
comparable companies to find the unlevered beta of the industry as well as 
to compute industry multiples valuation we did not include Wizz Air once its 
capital structure is very far from Ryanair’s own capital structure (Wizz Air Net 
Debt to Equity: -84.24%).  
Finally, US comparable included for valuation purposes in multiples valuation 
were Southwest Airline (the largest low-cost airline at a global level) that 
inspired Ryanair, and which presents a similar capital structure (Net Debt to 
Equity: 4.25% Southwest Airlines) and price-earnings ratio (12.2x Southwest 
Airlines and 18.0x Ryanair). JetBlue was also selected to multiples valuation 
once is one of the biggest low-cost airlines in US showing similar levels of 
revenues and EBITDA as Ryanair (Revenues: 6991.05€ JetBlue versus 
7697.4€ Ryanair) as well as identical capital structure (16.98% JetBlue).  
• Legacy Carriers  
Besides LCCs, other comparable companies included are long-haul airlines 
(Lufthansa and Air-France) as well a group (IAG).  
IAG is a comparable airline in the sense that it is the owner of the second 
largest low-cost airline in Ireland after Ryanair, Aer Lingus, and even though 
overall group revenues and costs are distinct from Ryanair (Revenues per 
pax: 216.02€ IAG versus 54.17€ Ryanair; Cost per pax: 187.54€ IAG versus 
47.02€ Ryanair)  – once the group has acquired other long-haul airlines - 
they have both close to the same level of operating margins (13.2% IAG) 
and return on capital employed (17% IAG versus 11% Ryanair).  












On its turn, Air France was also chosen given its high load factor (90% Air-
France), and similarity of operating margins when compared to Ryanair (12% 
Air-France). However, we had to exclude from the analysis of the unlevered 
beta of Ryanair as well as from multiples valuation once it has a very 
distinctive capital structure (Net debt to equity ratio: 383.75%).  
Finally, Lufthansa by being the carrier leader in Germany, and which recently 
has been attempting to set lower fares in order to compete directly with 
Ryanair on its ‘home-market’.  In addiction it is alike Ryanair in terms of 
capital structure (Net Debt to Equity: 37.04% Lufthansa) (see all in Exhibit 20 
and Exhibit 21). 
Value Drivers 
Revenue 
Ryanair’s country of origin is Ireland, nonetheless its operations are also 
relevant in other countries such as United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. Total revenues of the company have increased for the last 5 years. 
Despite the decrease of 3% in UK’s demand segment from 2017 to 2018, that 
followed the announcement of a possible Brexit (see Exhibit 22).  
As previously stated, UK is the country where Ryanair collects the highest 
revenues (22% share of total revenues), followed by Italy (19% share) and 
Spain (14% share) (see Exhibit 23).  
Our research team witnessed that due to overcapacity in Europe, average 
fares have been pushed down, especially in Germany – given that Lufthansa 
by buying Air Berlin, gained more capacity and strengthened its position in the 
country, forcing Ryanair to set very competitive fares (37€ vs 176€) 
In the FY 19 there was an increase of 2% in total revenues which is driven by 
the increase in the number of passengers of 9% that clearly offsets the 








Exhibit 22: Revenues by Country   
Source: Annual Report  
Exhibit 23: Countries share of Total Revenues   
Source: Annual Report  
Exhibit 24: Ryanair’s Total Revenues Past Evolution   
Source: Annual Report  
 
 









Ryanair has risen 12% its cost per booked passenger, from 42.08 € in FY18 
to 47.02€ in FY19, due to higher oil prices (17% more fuel costs per booked 
passenger, representing 36% of the total Ryanair’s cost structure), and staff 
and marketing costs (an increase of nearly 22% per booked passenger). To 
add up, there were EU261 costs that rose 44% as a result of several ATC 
staff strikes and some shortages in summer 2018, causing many flight delays 
and cancellations. Even though these increment in Ryanair’s unit costs is 
significant, the airline still presents the lowest cost per passenger basis 
relative to its competitors (see Exhibit 25). 
 The graph below shows operating expenses increasing along the last five 
years from €4,378.1m in 2014 to €6,680m in 2019. All changes are due to 
fluctuations on following costs: fuel costs, airport and handling charges, staff 
costs, route charges, maintenance, materials and repairs, aircraft rentals and 
depreciation. Part of these costs are considered as cost of goods sold 
whereas the other part such as marketing, distribution and others are selling, 






Forecast Income Statement 
Revenues 
Demand 
Given that 90% of Ryanair’s revenues come from operations in Europe and 
that Ryanair still wants to expand further in these region, our research run a 
regression to assess the correlation between European GDP growth  and the 
European air traffic demand (RPK) (see Exhibit 27) that in fact  resulted into a 
positive and strong correlation (R-square=72%). 
Exhibit 25: Airlines Cost Per Booked Passenger   
Source: Annual Reports  
Exhibit 26: Ryanair Cost Structure Over Time   
Source: Annual Reports 
4 378,1 4 611,1






2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Cost Structure
Fuel and oil Airport and handling charges Staff costs
Route charges Depreciation Marketing, distribution and other
Maintenance, materials and repairs Aircraft rentals Total Costs
Exhibit 27: Regression of European RPK growth explained 
by European GDP Growth  
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
 








RPK= 0.0349+ 1.709*European GDP growth 
Air traffic demand expanded at a 1.71x European GDP multiplier since 2011 
and for the upcoming years our research team expects a year on year 
increase of 6% CAGR by taking into account the GDP growth in Europe 
predicted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
We went further in our analysis and we assessed the relationship between the 
Ryanair’s demand (RPMS) and the economic growth (GDP) of the countries 
where Ryanair operates in today’s times. What we found was that actually 
both variables (RPMS and GDP of those countries) are also positively 
correlated but present an even higher R-square of 88% (see Exhibit 28).  
In this sense, we accounted to the R-square of both regressions and we 
decided to apply the forecast to the GDP of the countries where Ryanair 
operates to set its future demand. This resulted in a CAGR to RPMS of 3.5% 









Total revenues are comprised by schedule revenues and ancillary revenues. 
Ancillary revenues account to close 32% of total operating revenues and are 
related to extra services on top of air passenger transportation such as non-
flight schedule services, excess baggage and priority seats, internet-related 
services and commercialization of food, beverage and merchandise, which 
have increased in greatest extent after the launch of Ryanair’s App. In turn, 
schedule revenues are directly related with the sale of tickets and account to 





Exhibit 28: Regression of Ryanair’s RPMS explained by 
GDP of countries where Ryanair operates 
















2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
RPMS 
Exhibit 29: Ryanair’s Revenues Per Miles Seats 
Source: Annual Report 
Exhibit 30: Ryanair’s Revenues Decomposition  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
 








Schedule revenues  
Schedule revenues were computed by applying the following formula: 
Schedule revenue= Average fare per booked passengers* Number of 
passengers  
To come up with the number of passengers carried our research team 
needed to compute the available seats by taking into account: the number of 
aircrafts, seats per aircraft and Ryanair’s load factor. We considered the 
number of aircrafts to be the ones expressed within contracts that Ryanair’s 
have established with Boeing in advance until 2024, resulting in a CAGR of 
2.98% of the number of aircrafts. The available seats of the airline are 
therefore the product of seats per aircraft by the number of aircrafts.  
Then, by taking into account fleet growth as well as the average number of 
passenger’s flights sector flown per aircraft, the supply in the year is the 
product between available seats and sectors flown per aircraft.  
Due to the arrival of the new Boeing 737-MAX-200 and substantial orders 
negotiated by Ryanair with Boeing until 2024, available seats are expected to 
grow with a CAGR of 3.2% from 2020 to 2024 (see Exhibit 31). 
After 2024, we used a different approach since there are no predictions of 
aircraft orders by that time in the future, therefore our research team 
estimated the number of aircrafts needed into the fleet based on the demand. 
Hence, between 2025 until 2029 the number of passengers will grow at a 
cumulative annual growth rate of 2.3% (see Exhibit 31) and higher load factor 
of 97%. All aircraft come as a result (see later in Forecast BS).  
Additionally, Ryanair estimated an increase in the number of passengers of 
around 41% from 2019 to 2024. However, our approach is more conservative 
showing a 20% growth of passengers flying with Ryanair and associated 
increase in scheduled revenues by an average annual growth of 4.03% (see 
Exhibit 32). 
Load Factor 
Ryanair load factor rose in the last 5 years showing a positive evolution of 
companies demand and efficiency (see Exhibit 33). 
We estimated load factor through the use of two different methodologies: on 
the one hand, from 2019 until 2024, the load factor depends exclusively on 
the annual demand of Ryanair’s flights (RPMS) as well as on its supply. 


























2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
PASSENGERS vs AVAILABLE SEATS
Total Available Seats Total Passengers in Millions
Exhibit 31: Ryanair’s number of passengers and available 
seats  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
Exhibit 32: Ryanair’s schedule revenue  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
 








Ryanair operates whereas supply comes from the aircrafts ordered in the 
Boeing contract of 2014 already agreed between Ryanair and Boeing.  
On the other hand, from 2025 onwards the load factor was set equal to the 
load factor between 2020 and 2024 which is 97%. We believe that the 97% 
load factor is a reasonable value to the long-term, because the underlying 
assumption that grounds our model is that Ryanair will be able to be more 
efficient than it is in the current days (load factor 96% FY19) after the arrival 
of the new Boeing 737-MAX-200 and moreover in an attempt to overcome 
capacity constraint issues in airports by fully fill its aircrafts with passengers. If 
anything changes with other competitors’ load factors, Ryanair will be still the 
most efficient airline in the upcoming years. Historical Ryanair’s performance 
also supports our grounding because Ryanair has prevailed with incremental 
changes of 1 percentage points on its load factor during the last 3 years (as 
we can see in Exhibit 33).   
Average Fare 
Concerning Ryanair’s average fare, this is a product of demand for flights and 
the total available seats. In order to address high levels of demand, seats are 
priced in a way to ensure that high load factors are in fact achieved. In 
Ryanair’s own words Ryanair’s fares are established by the “load factor 
active-yield passive” policy. What this policy means is that, average fares 
have an inverse relation with regards to the load factor. The higher the load 
factor reached, the lower is going to be the average fare.  
The negative correlation if it is to remain over the next years, due to resulting 
high load factor computed of 97% between 2020 and 2029, averages fares 
will be necessarily competitive (see Exhibit 34). 
An additional study that our research team went through was to understand 
Ryanair’s elasticity of demand. We analysed averages fares and the demand 
in the last 21 years, the period corresponding to 1998-2019. Our findings 
suggest that Ryanair has an elastic demand (once the slope of the regression 
is not steep, slope= -0.0891). In other words, any moderate change in 
average prices has a huge impact on the demand for a certain flight. 
Therefore, if Ryanair is to increase its average fare it has to be careful once 
the outcome on demand is by all means higher (demand contracts 
significantly) (see in Exhibit 35).  
Subsequent to Ryanair’s elasticity of demand is its non-fuel surcharges policy 
in which any costs arising from fluctuations in fuel prices cannot be passed 
away through averages scheduled fares. By applying such policy, the airline 
prevents itself of chasing away demand for flights. Rather than that, what 
Exhibit 33: Ryanair’s load factor in the last 5 years  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
Exhibit 34: Ryanair’s load factor vs average fare  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
Exhibit 35: Ryanair’s demand elasticity from 1998-2019  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
 








Ryanair does is to shift those costs to the price of ancillary services, exactly 









The company has developed multiple ancillary services, for instance by 
offering accommodation, travel insurance as well as a service of rent-a-car 
available on its website and through CarTrawler. The average ancillary 
revenues per booked passenger have been increasing for the last 3 years 
from 14.74€ in 2016 to 17.15€ in 2019. Therefore, the average ancillary 
revenue per booked passenger is adjusted by inflationary moves in the 
upcoming years until 2029, presenting an average annual growth of 2% 




As mentioned before, fuel costs have the largest share of Ryanair’s total 
operating costs (see in Exhibit 38) and that is the main reason on the back of 
its hedging strategy against price fluctuation arising from jet fuel and against 
FX risk once crude oil is priced in US dollars. In order to do so, Ryanair 
usually signs forward contracts/hedging arrangements that in the specific 
case of jet fuel contracts, usually cover periods of up to 18 months of 
anticipated jet fuel requirements. By entering into forward jet fuel contracts 
Ryanair is covered by 90% FY20, which is equivalent to 709$ per metric ton 
and in 2021 it is already covered by 37% of its estimated costs at prices 
equivalent to 632$ per metric ton. In this sense, Ryanair can avoid 
transferring jet fuel price fluctuations through average fares to customers.  
Exhibit 36: Ryanair’s ancillary revenue per BP vs Fuel 
costs per BP  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 37: Ryanair’s ancillary revenuer per BP  
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
  
Exhibit 38: Ryanair’s operating costs weights  












Considering all the factors that may drive fuel costs changes such as 
exchange rate risk, a disruption in supply, a sudden increase in demand or 
even market speculation our research team estimated those costs based on 
the forecast of the average cost per U.S gallon according to U.S Energy 
Administration Information (EIA). The unit cost was initially expressed in 
$/MMBtu, therefore we had to convert into $/gallon. After that we also took 
into account the impact of the FX risk, by converting the forecast from U.S. 
Dollars into Euros (see Exhibit 39) and any increase in prices arising from 
inflation over time to come up with final unit cost to jet fuel.     
In order to calculate total fuel costs, we considered the average fuel 
consumption per seat into the analysis and finally we applied the next 
formula: 






 The average consumption per seat is foreseen to decrease from 2020 
onwards due to the arrival of the new Boeing 737-MAX-200. This aircraft 
despite being larger with 4% more seats compared to the previous Boeing 
737-800, it provides lower jet fuel consumption per seat of 16% in the next 5 
years which is translated into a CAGR of 3.24%, from 2020-2024 and 6.28% 
from 2025 onwards. 
Therefore, in our model during the first years of our forecast jet fuel prices are 
expected to decrease up to a certain point in time in which this trend inverts 
and the cost per gallon increases. The increase of the routes networks also 
leads to higher fuel costs over time (see Exhibit 40). 
 
Airport and handling charges 
The Airport and handling charges importance to overall cost structure has 
been increasing, with a weight of between 18%-19% of the total operating 
costs of the company. Therefore, we estimated an average annual growth 
rate of 6% from 2020 to 2029, based in the estimated number of airports 
served by the airline, which is expected to increase due to new routes on its 
network and aligned with Ryanair’s expansion strategy (see Exhibit 41), 
 
Exhibit 39: Exchange Rate Risk associate with fuel  
Source: Annual Report, EIA & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 40: Fuel costs and average fuel consumption 
evolution 
Source: Annual Report, EIA & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 41: Ryanair’s airport and handling charges evolution 
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
 








representing from 2020 onwards approximately 21% of the total operating 
costs of the company (see Exhibit 42) 
Ryanair seeks to operate in airports that can offer lower airport and handling 
charges and that have more available slots. The airline successful 
performance overtime measured by its air passenger traffic growth in many 
European airports created a competitive advantage that many of its peers 
lack of and that allows the airline to negotiate better conditions on its 
contracts despite fierce competition by limited slots.  
 In addition, the company has chosen towards less expensive gate location as 
well as outdoor boarding stairs so that it can save on airport charges. 
Moreover, there was an increase of handling charges that resulted from the 
rise in the number of passengers flying with the airline. To address this issue, 
right now Ryanair requires all passengers to check-in in advance, on the 
internet, reducing the waiting time in airports and adding the option of paying 
bags on top of the average fare with the aim of reducing the number of bags 
carried by passengers.  
 
Staff costs 
 Staff costs are estimated according to the number of workers per aircraft. 
However, since some of Ryanair’s aircrafts were grounded and new aircrafts 
deliveries were delayed, the company incurred in a reduction of staff 
members of merely 0.09% between 2019 in 2020. Nevertheless, for the 
upcoming years we assumed that the situation is normalized and therefore 
personnel costs will increase on average 5% per year once Ryanair’s will 




Recently, there has been a rise in route charges coming from the expansion 
of sectors flown. Our research team estimated these costs based on the 
evolution of total miles flown per year as well as on the average length which 
translates into average miles travelled by passengers carried by Ryanair 
predicted to remain at 774 from 2020 onwards. 
Total miles flown by Ryanair are then the product of the average length by 
total sectors’ flown. The result was an increase in route charges of around 5% 
annually (see Exhibit 44). 
 
Exhibit 42: Ryanair’s airport and handling charges as % of 
operating costs 
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 43: Ryanair’s Staff costs and team 
members 
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 44: Ryanair’s Route charges 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
 










Ryanair’ aircraft can be financed by two different leasing contracts: finance 
leases and operating leases. Operating leases are directly charged to the 
income statement in this caption whereas finance leases are only charged to 
the income statement by its interest rate part while its reimbursements are 
accounted in the balance sheet. Therefore, predictions of aircrafts rentals 
were computed by considering the aircraft rentals per leased aircrafts and are 
increasing with total number of leased aircrafts. (see Exhibit 45). Considering 
this, aircraft rentals costs per leased aircrafts that Ryanair has per year, leads 





Forecast Balance Sheet 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
There are several elements included in Ryanair’s property, plan and 
equipment weighting very differently to the overall value of the caption PPE: 
Aircrafts (98.7% FY19), Hangar and Buildings (0.58%), Plant and Equipment 
(0.55%), Fixtures and Fitting (0.16%) and Motor Vehicles (close to 0,0%). 
Aircrafts are indeed the most significant part of PPE not only due to the high 
price paid by Ryanair per aircraft (close to 81.4 US dollars to Boeing 737-800) 
but also due to past investments incurred by Ryanair on its fleet growth as 
well as future projections of further increases in the number of aircrafts (see 
Exhibit 47).   
In the end of FY19, Ryanair had a fleet of 471 aircrafts which included 455 
Boeing 747-800 and 16 airbus A320. Ryanair has agreed upon a new Boeing 
contract, the so-called “2014 Boeing Contract” in which it expects to acquire 
135 Boeings aircrafts and additional 75 orders with options (under leasing 
agreements). 
 From 2020 until 2024 Boeing aircrafts acquisitions (see Exhibit 47) are 
according to the “2014 Boeing Contract”. With respect to returns and 
disposals of aircrafts in the same period, these were obtained in order to 





















































Planned Returns and Disposals






































































































































































Exhibit 45: Ryanair’s Aircraft Rental costs 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 46: Ryanair’s Aircraft rentals costs per leased aircrafts 
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 47: Boeing contracts deliveries 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 48: Aircraft returns and disposals 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
 








Once there is no contract pre-negotiated to the period after 2024, all Boeing 
737-Max-200 expected to arrive in that period as well as returns and 
disposals of the old model Boeing 737-800 are a result of the demand by 
Ryanair’s flights as well as a product of its expected load factor (see Exhibit 
48).   
In year 2019, a new aircraft from another supplier - Airbus - entered into 
Ryanair’s fleet, Airbus A320 (see Exhibit 49). A320 are aircrafts coming from 
Laudamotion, after Ryanair’s acquisition of the airline. A320 are leasing 
contracts with 5 years maturity. Our research team supports the view that 
those Airbus are an opportunity to Ryanair to supply from a difference source 
in years of reasonable uncertainty related to the FAA and EASA future 
authorization to the return to service of Boeing 737. In this sense, our 
assumption is that Airbus aircraft will remain on Ryanair’s fleet during the 5 
contractual years.  
Regarding hangar and buildings, these were projected to follow the evolution 
of site and floor area per aircraft. This caption is indeed the one which reflects 
better overcapacity in European airports. Therefore, site and floor area are 
predicted to decrease by 3.26%.  Notice the following, even though area per 
aircraft is contracting, overall hangar and buildings increase from 2021 until 
2023 due to high fleet growth. Hangar and buildings still have to 
accommodate fleet expansion (see Exhibit 50). 
Plant and Equipment, Fixtures and Fittings as well as Motor Vehicles are 
weightless to the total value of PPE.   
    
PPE Financing Method 
Aircrafts will be financed in different ways in the upcoming years. Up until the 
moment, aircrafts financed through bank loans have reduced over time (on 
average less 13 aircrafts/7.3% yearly reduction up to FY19) - impacting the 
value of debt outstanding which consequently also decreases. Our research 
team expects the same reduction to happen in the upcoming year which 
means that debt will be repaid along the years  
 Aircrafts financed through JOLCOS, finance leases, have decreased as long 
as call options are exercised. The exercise of these options also means a 
reduction in the value of debt outstating likewise bank loans (see Exhibit 51). 
Our research team also expects lessen JOLCOS financed aircrafts in the 
future once remaining 12 JOLCOS will have to be exercised within period of 
10.5 years.  
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Exhibit 49: Fleet per Aircraft Model 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 50: Hangar and buildings 
Source: Annual Report & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 51: Ryanair’ fleet share by EX-IM Bank and 
Jolcos financing 
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 52: Ryanair’ fleet share by own resources and 
operating leases  
Source: Annual Report& Analysts Estimates  
 
 








Aircrafts financed by Ryanair’s own resources - through debt issuance or 
equity - have increased their share on Ryanair’s total fleet (see Exhibit 52). 
Our model assumes that all future aircrafts projected into the 2014 Boeing 
contract and further acquisitions will be financed by a mix of debt issuance 
and equity. Debt issuance is the most recent financing method used by 
Ryanair since 2014 (see Exhibit 53).  Ryanair started doing so because on 
the hand debt capital markets have had attractive bond yields since 2009 and 
on the other hand because debt capital markets do not have the same 










The value of total debt is split into finance leases obligations and long-term 
debt. The caption “finance lease obligations” within debt regards to the 
present value of all future lease obligations associated to the 13-year Euro-
denominated JOLCOS used to finance part of Ryanair’s fleet as well as the 
present value of future payments that belong to the commercial debt 
contracts. The way that our research team estimated future repayments and 
consequently the evolution of the finance lease caption was by looking to the 
amount of repayments made by Ryanair year by year taking also into account 
the aircrafts in the fleet which had still debt outstanding. As long as debt from 
finance lease contracts is repaid the caption “finance lease” decreases, until 
the moment in which all aircraft under JOLCOS and commercial debt 
contracts have been totally paid back.  
A similar approach was implemented to forecast the caption “long-term debt” 
in our forecast, .This caption concerns to the present value of future 
obligations related to aircrafts through financed by loans such as the ones 
provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States and in addiction 
 
Exhibit 53: Ryanair’ aircrafts by financing method evolution 










































































Exhibit 54: Ryanair Total Debt Evolution  








































































































Aircrafts by Financing Method
Ex-IM Bank Guaranteed Financing JOLCOS - Finance Leases
Commercial Debt - Finance leases Ryanair own resources
No outstading debt Operating Lease Arrangements (Including A320)
 
 








relative to three Eurobonds issued in debt capital markets. What our research 
expects is that this caption will evolve by decreasing as long as aircrafts are 
repaid back to the financial institution (Ex-IM US Bank) and or to Eurobond 
holders. The opposite happens if Ryanair is going to raise additional funds 
through debt issuance (see Exhibit 54).   
In past years due to lower bond yields in debt capital markets after 2009 
Ryanair opted by raising funds to invest in its fleet expansion through debt 
issuance. The low bond yields environment remains and therefore we believe 
that Ryanair will keep the same rational for the upcoming years by raising 
additional funds through more debt issuance. Moreover, looking to the credit 
rating of Ryanair (see Exhibit 55) versus its peers, Ryanair has the highest 
credit rating which makes the Irish airline a very attractive investment to any 
investor that aims diversify its portfolio towards the airline sector.  
Valuation 
Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity was computed through CAPM model and the inputs of the 
analysis are market risk premium, the risk-free rate and beta levered. 
The market risk premium was based on a proxy to the market return, 
annualized 11-year MSCI World index of 7.41% and on a risk-free rate, the 
10-year German Government Bond yields, given that our forecast has a 10-
years horizon until perpetuity and German bonds are also denominated in 
Euros, the same currency of Ryanair’s cash-flows. Therefore, our best proxy 
to the Re is 6.06% given a risk free of 1.45%, a market return of 7.41%, and 
market risk premium of 5.96%.   
The equity beta of Ryanair was estimated through the regression between the 
excess stock return (variable y) and the excess market return (variable x). We 
used monthly returns to the last 11 years (2008-2019), resulting in a 
statistically significant beta of 0.51, with 95% confidence interval that ranges 
between [0.192;0.825].   
Beta unlevered of the industry was estimated by using Ryanair European 
comparable airlines, as we believe that they share the same risk level (see 
Exhibit 56) not only in geographic means, since they all operate in Europe 
and have a large extent of their revenues coming from there but also 
because they present a similar cost structure (given by their net debt to 
equity ratio) (see Exhibit 57).The companies considered were then, the LCC 
Easy Jet and other European legacy carriers Lufthansa Group and IAG 
Ryanair Credit Rating S&P Moody's 
Long-Term BBB+ BBB+
Outlook Stable Stable
2014 Bond BBB+ BBB+
2015 Bond BBB+ BBB+
2017 Bond BBB+ BBB+
 
Exhibit 56: European Airlines Unlevered Betas 
Source: Bloomberg & Analysts Estimates  
 
Exhibit 57: European Airlines D/E ratio 
Source: Bloomberg   
 
Exhibit 55: Ryanair Credit Rating  
Source: Ryanair Official Website  
 
 








Holdings plc. All airlines mentioned likewise Ryanair belong to the top 10 
airlines with the highest number of passengers.  
The unlevered beta computed from the industry average resulted in a value of 
0.70 (see Exhibit 58) that was re-levered afterwards ending up at 0.77 (inside 
the confidence interval). Given Ryanair’s net debt to equity ratio of 9.29%, the 
already mentioned cost of equity obtained was 6.06%. 
A sensitivity analysis to the beta was performed and this analysis is going to 
be detailed later on. 
 
Cost of debt  
In order to calculate Ryanair’s cost of debt, we had to come up with a value 
for a 10-years yield to Ryanair (corresponding to the period of our forecast 
which is also 10 years long). Ryanair only has bonds with shorter maturities 
traded in the market, therefore in order to reach a reasonable value for a bond 
with a maturity of 10 years, we estimated a regression with yields from 
Ryanair and from EasyJet that also have the same credit rating (BBB+). In 
addition to these yields, we added the European Composite BBB. From the 
regression, the 10-years yield obtained was 1.05%. By considering THE 
correspondent recovery rate (53.90%) and annual probability of default 
(0.21%), retrieved from Moody’s, we obtain the final value to the cost of debt 
which is 0.95% (see Exhibit 59) 
 
Discounted Cash Flow Method (DCF) 
The intrinsic valuation model was based on the Discounted Cash Flow 
Method, by discounting future unlevered FCF by the WACC which is the 
discount rate that represents Ryanair’s risk according to its capital structure. 
The resulting WACC was of 5.62%.  
The time horizon of our forecast was established according to the period of 
stabilization of unlevered FCFs. From 2020 to 2025 our growth rate of cash 
flows was higher due to huge investment rates arising from expected aircraft 
orders. However, from 2026 onwards both ROIC and the reinvestment rate 
decrease because there are fewer aircraft orders and part of fleet is returned 













































Exhibit 58: Average Industry Beta 
Source: Bloomberg   
 
Exhibit 60: ROIC 
Source: Analysts estimates  
 
Exhibit 59: European Composite BBB Yields, EasyJet Bond 
Yields and Ryanair Bond Yields  
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 








flow starts to stabilize, reaching a steady state of 2%, which seems 
reasonable since it is lower than the European nominal GDP of 3.63%28  . 
The return on capital invested (ROIC) of 12% (see Exhibit 60) is higher than 
the cost of capital (WACC) of 5.62%, therefore in our model Ryanair keeps 
creating value in the future.  
 
Enterprise Value, Equity Value and Target Price 
Considering, a WACC of 5.62% and a long-term growth rate of 2%, the 
terminal value computed was 15,965€ in the FY29. Ryanair reached in 
FY2020 an Enterprise value of 22 493.37€ adding up to the non-core invested 
capital of 1480.90€. (see Exhibit 61) 
We estimate a target price of 16.77 € in FY2020, with an expected capital 
gain of 14.9%, and dividend yield to shareholders of 3% resulting in an 
expected return of 17.9%. This expected return leads our research team to 
recommend investors to BUY Ryanair’s shares.  
Multiples  
Ryanair’s share price was assessed through, relative valuation by using as 
multiples the EV/EBIT, EV/EBITDA and P/E. The criteria for the selection of 
the companies were the return on invested capital, sustainable growth rate as 
well as similar capital structures measured by their net debt to equity ratio. In 
this sense, peer companies chosen were Lufthansa (ROIC 5%, Growth rate 
2% and Net debt to Equity of 37%), EasyJet (ROIC 8%, Growth rate 6% and 
Net debt to equity of 9%), as well as US companies such as Southwest Airline 
(ROIC 17%, Growth rate 21% and Net debt to equity of 4%) and finally 
JetBlue (ROIC 9%, Growth rate 13% and Net debt to equity of17%). All of 
these airlines are compared to Ryanair which is presently traded with a ROIC 
of 9%, sustainable growth rate of 2% and a value of net debt to equity of 9%.  
The median multiples obtained from the above-mentioned comparable airlines 
to EV/EBIT, EV/EBITDA and P/E are 9.9x, 5.4x, and 11.2x respectively. 
Ryanair’s own multiples computed from DCF valuation are EV/EBIT 13.4 x, 
P/E 13.0x, and EV/EBITDA 9.8x. All multiples from Ryanair’s DCF are above 
the median industry target and our research team believes that this may be 
happening due to Ryanair’s successful historical performance which has been 
above the industry average as well as due to our team expectations of 
Ryanair’s future growth. Underlying share prices obtained from multiples of 
 
28 International Monetary Fund 
 
 
Exhibit 61: Enterprise Value, Equity Value, Terminal 
Value, Non-core invested capital and Net Debt 
Source: Analysts estimates  
16.77 
 
Exhibit 62: Share Price Football Field 
Source: Analyst estimates  
 
 








the peer group are 7.87€ to EV/EBITDA ratio, 11.66€ to EV/EBIT and finally 
14.44€ to P/E ratio. These values are in fact significantly below Ryanair’s 
price target obtained in the main valuation of 16.77€ (see Exhibit 62).  
These results show to our team that in fact due to current fierce environment 
in the European airline sector, many of Ryanair’s peers have been traded at 
lower multiples. However, Ryanair is an outlier hence in present days it has 
presented above the industry multiples, translating investors’ high expectation 
about Ryanair’s future performance and growth prospective.   
Our team also compared Ryanair’s multiples from the DCF model with those 
extracted from Bloomberg (EV/EBITDA 9.6X, EV/EBIT 16.3X and P/E 18.0). 
In fact, Bloomberg multiples are even higher than those from our valuation 
which may indicate that our team DCF model valuation is reasonable.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Some irresolutions arise when our research team computed Ryanair’s WACC, 
more precisely at the level of beta levered and to estimate Long-term Growth 
of the perpetuity period. In this sense, our aim is to understand how sensitive 
the share price is to changes in WACC – by taking into account a different 
beta levered – and changes in the Long-term Growth Rate. 
Beta levered included to the sensitive analysis were: the lower-limit and 
upper-limit [0.19;0.82] of beta levered confidence interval, the beta equity 
which directly comes from Ryanair’s regression between its excess of stocks 
and the market risk premium (0.51, in fact this beta does not account to other 
comparable airlines beta) and finally the resulting beta levered based on the 
median of comparable airlines (0.83) instead of the average used in the main 
valuation. Analysing the cost of equity obtained from each beta levered, 
results are aligned, with exceptions of 2.60% cost of equity (Re) coming from 
the lower-limit confidence interval of beta levered (0.19) and the 4.48% cost of 
equity (Re) from the coefficient of Ryanair’s regression (0.51).   
WACCs included in the sensitivity were obtained by considering the same 
Cost of debt (Rd) (0.95%) and D/E ratio (9.29%), but different Re provided by 
the sensitivity analysis above mentioned. Therefore, to both deviations of Re 
(2.60% and 4.48%) previously stated, the WACC decreases by 3.17% and 
1.45%, resulting in a merely 2.45% and 4.17% WACC (see Exhibit 63).  
Then, by taking several WACCs into the analysis and adding a sensitivity also 
to the Long-term Growth rate by varying -/+1% the main valuation steady 
growth rate of 2.18% and also considering the nominal GDP Growth of 
 
Exhibit 63: Cost of Equity and WACC sensitivity 
analysis  
Source: Analysts estimates  
 
 








Europe (3.63%) as a possible alternative to the long-term growth rate, we 
estimated resulting share prices. 
To the value of WACC of 2.45% and with Long-term Growth rates higher than 
2.18% the analysis completely loses its meaning given that we have a cost of 
capital (WACC) which is higher than ROIC. In other words, Ryanair is 
destroying value over time, ending up with negative share prices. 
In general, to the lowest values of WACC (2.45% and 4.17%) and the lowest 
Long-term Growth rates (1.18% and 2.18%) the share price was abnormally 
high. 
Reasonable share prices results were attained to WACCs close to 6% and a 
Long-term Growth up to 2%, leading to a price decrease between 35% to 9%, 
turning the price recommendation to be ‘Sell’. Whereas in the case of WACCs 
still close to 6% but with Long-term Growth rates beyond 2%, share prices 


















       
 
Exhibit 64: Long-term growth and WACC 
sensitivity analysis  
Source: Analysts estimates  
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The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of political uncertainties 
surrounding Brexit in Ryanair’s stock price and additional effects on 
valuation conclusions. 
 
The stock market has been affected by several decision taken, and Brexit 
was one of the reasons pushing down airlines stock prices in 2016. 
Therefore, the magnitude of a decrease in U.K. ‘s demand following a 
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Political and economic decisions can significantly affect the stock market and Brexit was not exception, the 
day after the referendum announcement, where was voted that U.K. would leave EU, have a strong impact 
with the global stock market losing around 2$ trillion (Quaye, I., Mu, Y., Abudu, B., & Agyare, R. (2016)). 
Besides some Index suffered drastic change such as, FTSE 250, an index that has in its composition some 
British companies, decreased around   7.2% (Riley &Long, 2016) as well as the FTSE 100 that dropped by 
3,2% in the day after the decision. However, this change was also reflected in the US stock market with 
S&P500 dropping 3.6% and Nasdaq decreasing over 3.4% (Mackenzie & Platt,2016).29 Additionally, 
European stock index composed by the five biggest stock markets in Europe (France, Italy, German, Spain 
and U.K), which countries are representative in Ryanair’s operations, also experienced some losses 
(Matthias,2019)30. 
On the other side, by analysing the Brexit reaction in the stock prices by sectors, it can be seen that the 
stock prices in airline sector were the ones that declines the most after the Brexit announcement, since it 
influence negatively free trade agreements, namely between U.K. and EU (Selmi.R,Bouoiyour, J., 2018)31. 
Thus, the global airline sector presents an average decrease in the share price of 25%32 , with U.K airlines 
decreasing on average 33% (kpmg,2016) from 21st to 27th of June 2016. Therefore, it is expected Ryanair’s 






29 Quaye, I., Mu, Y., Abudu, B., & Agyare, R. (2016). Review of Stock Markets’ Reaction to New Events: Evidence from Brexit. Journal of Financial Risk 
Management, 5, 281-314. Retrieved from: https://file.scirp.org/pdf/JFRM_2016123011255805.pdf 
30Raddant, Matthias (2016) : The response of European stock markets to the Brexit, Kiel Policy Brief, No. 100, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel. 
Retrieved from:https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/156089/1/882200887.pdf 
31  Selmi, R., Bouoiyour, J. , (2018).Are UK industries  resilient in dealing  with uncertainty? The case of Brexit. Retrieved from: https://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/hal-01736632/ 
32 Brexit implications for airlines, KPMG (2016). Retrieved from: https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/cl/pdf/2016-11-kpmg-chile-advisory-brexit-airlines.pdf 
 
 









Ryanair is a low-cost airline, that have headquarters in Ireland, it has the largest European airline group, 
composed by Ryanair U.K., Ryanair Sun, Malta Air and Lauda motion. It operates in several countries, 
among others, U.K, German and Italy. 
The company operations are mainly performed in Europe, being most of the flights between countries that 
belongs in the European Union. Therefore, Ryanair take advantage of the single travel market provided by 
European Common Aviation Area (ECAA). 






Between day 22nd and 28th of June 2016, the Ryanair share price decreases, this can be linked, as mentioned 
above, with the Brexit referendum announcement on 23rd of June of 2016, that results in a decrease of 21% 
in the share price. 
However, analysing the main European comparable of Ryanair, we can conclude that this political event 
was most harmful for airlines whose headquarters where in London, such as Easy Jet  with a 29.67% 
decline in the share price in the period of analysis and IAG with a  decrease of 29.13%. 
Airline Ryanair Noreweigian Easy jet Wizz Air Lufthansa Dart Group IAG  
Price decrease -20.19% -14.56% -29.67% -22.51% -9.94% -12.94% -29.13% 
 
Additionally, it was expected that the Brexit would take place on 29 March of 2019. However, during in 
2019 it was announced two postpones of the deal,, which caused a positive reaction in the share price of 












between 9th and 17th of April by 11% in Ryanair’s share price and by the second announcement made by 






 Besides, Ryanair U.K is one of the largest subsidiaries of the group, their revenues account for 22% of the 
total group’s revenue in the fiscal year 2019. Therefore, the risk of a non-deal or Hard Brexit can be 
significant for companies’ operations. Since the announcement of the referendum in 2016, the company 
decided to guide its growth away from U.K airports to focus on the other European airports, and hence, the 
contribution of U.K revenues in the total revenues decreased in the last three years. 
Revenue 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
United Kingdom 25% 27% 28% 25% 23% 22% 
In Anticipating a hard Brexit, Ryanair pretend to establish an air operating certificate by CAA (Civil 
Aviation Authority), to grant its right to continue to carry U.K operations, performing flights from U.K 
domestic routes and non-EU after Brexit. 
Non-deal Brexit implications 
The Air transports in Europe Union are insert in the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) that is 
regulated by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), with the aim of creating a single aviation 
market and bring economic benefits for air travellers and air industry. Once the UK leaves European Union 
it will be leaving the ECAA and its air transports would no longer be regulated by EASA. 
Thereby, under a non-deal situation, Brexit can impact Ryanair’s business concerning inter alia, the 
situation of UK in relation to EU and the potential lack of freedom when flying between UK and the 
 
 








Europe Union. Any small change in these previous aspects can harm Ryanair operational results 
substantially.  
Analysing the lack of freedom impact , it is expected that UK GDP being 2.5%-3.5% lower than the actual 
scenario, being the GDP a proxied for air traffic demand it is expected that the UK air passengers traffic 
reduced between 3-5% by 2020 (IATA,2016). This reduction is directly related to potential difficulties in 
performing flights between U.K and EU countries. 
 Therefore, in order to asses this impact in our valuation, we performed three scenarios, that reflect the 
estimated reduction in the U.K passenger traffic, since this market has a representative weight in Ryanair’s 
operations. 
Considering the current Ryanair’s average fare of 37.02€ and number of passengers142m in the Fiscal Year 
of 2019. 
By incorporating the impact of estimated passengers decrease of United Kingdom in the Ryanair’s demand 
it is assess different impacts on the company’s share price. The total revenue estimated was calculated by 
each scenario according to the following formula:  
Estimated revenue (2020) = (1-decrease in passengers)*Revenue 2019 
Considering a percentage of EBIT in total revenue of 21% FY2020, it is possible to obtain the estimated 
EBIT for every scenario, through the formula: 
Estimated EBIT(2020)= EBIT/Revenue (2020)*Estimated Total Revenue (2020) 
 In order to arise in an estimation for the enterprise value it was take into account the EV/EBIT multiple of 
13.39 obtain trough DCF approach in our base scenario, the one considered in the report. 
Therefore, the EV was obtain by: Estimated EV (2020)=EV/EBIT * Estimated EBIT(2020) 




EBIT EV Share 
price 
%Decreasing 
3.00% 138.77 7,518.68 1595.83 21,375.24 15.79 5.87% 
4.00% 137.34 7,441.17 1579.38 21,154.88 15.59 7.02% 
















Assuming the same values of net debt and number of shares as the ones obtain in the fiscal year 2019, it 
was possible to arrive to different share prices. However, in our DCF approach considered in the overall 
report the Ryanair’s share price obtain was 16.77 €, under this scenario is noticed a decrease in share price 
being the worst-case scenario the one where the air traffic demand decrease by 5%, and the least impactful 
the one where the demand decrease by 3%. These results present a decrease of 8.18% and 5.87% 
respectively. 
However, it is noted that the decrease in United Kingdom demand it does not cause a significant decrease 
in the Ryanair’s share price. 
Conclusion 
Considering the different scenarios of decrease in demand due to Brexit, the one with a 3% decrease result 
in the same recommendation as the one in the general report, BUY. However, for the remain scenarios with 
higher decreases of 4% and 5%, the resulting price as well as expected return is lower and hence our 
recommendation changes to HOLD. A further research could be to analyse the impact of the Certification 









Non core Invested Capital 1,480.90 
Net Debt 4,963.97 
Equity 19,010.30 
#Shares 1,133.40 
Share Price 16.77€ 
